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Abstract
We show that the cost of market orders and the profit of infinitesimal
market-making or -taking strategies can be expressed in terms of directly
observable quantities, namely the spread and the lag-dependent impact
function. Imposing that any market taking or liquidity providing strate-
gies is at best marginally profitable, we obtain a linear relation between
the bid-ask spread and the instantaneous impact of market orders, in good
agreement with our empirical observations on electronic markets. We then
use this relation to justify a strong, and hitherto unnoticed, empirical cor-
relation between the spread and the volatility per trade, with R2s exceeding
0.9. This correlation suggests both that the main determinant of the bid-
ask spread is adverse selection, and that most of the volatility comes from
trade impact. We argue that the role of the time-horizon appearing in the
definition of costs is crucial and that long-range correlations in the order
flow, overlooked in previous studies, must be carefully factored in. We find
that the spread is significantly larger on the nyse, a liquid market with
specialists, where monopoly rents appear to be present.
1 Introduction and review of the literature
One of the most important attribute of financial markets is to provide immediate
liquidity to investors [1], who are able to convert cash into stocks and vice-versa
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nearly instantaneously whenever they choose to do so. Of course, some markets
are more liquid than others and the liquidity of a given market varies in time
and can in fact dramatically dry up in crisis situations. How should markets
be organized, at the micro-structural level, to optimize liquidity, to favor steady
and orderly trading and avoid these liquidity crises? In the past, the burden
of providing liquidity was given to “market makers” (or specialists). In order
to ensure steady trading, the specialists alternatively sell to buyers and buy to
sellers, and get compensated by the so-called bid-ask spread – i.e. the price at
which they sell to the crowd is always slightly larger than the price at which they
buy. The determinants of the value of the spread in specialists markets have been
the subject of many studies in the economics literature [2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10],
and [11] for a recent review.
However, most financial markets have nowadays become fully electronic (with
the notable exception of the New-York Stock Exchange, nyse – although this will
soon change). In these markets, liquidity is self-organized, in the sense that any
agent can choose, at any instant of time, to either provide liquidity or consume
liquidity. More precisely, any agent can provide liquidity by posting limit orders:
these are propositions to sell (or buy) a certain volume of shares or lots at a
fixed minimum (maximum) price. Limit orders are stored in the order-book. At
a given instant in time, the best offer on the sell side (the ‘ask’) is higher than
the best price on the buy side (the ‘bid’) so no transaction takes place. For a
transaction to occur, an agent must consume liquidity by issuing a market order
to buy (or to sell) a certain number of shares; the transaction occurs at the best
available price, provided the volume in the order book at that price is enough to
absorb the incoming market order. Otherwise, the price ‘walks up’ (or down) the
ladder of offers in the order book, until the order is fully satisfied. The liquidity of
the market is partially characterized by the bid-ask spread S, which sets the cost
of an instantaneous round-trip of one share (a buy instantaneously followed by a
sell, or vice versa).1 A liquid market is such that this cost is small. A question
of both theoretical and practical crucial importance is to know what fixes the
magnitude of the spread in the self-organized set-up of electronic markets, and
the relative merit of limit vs. market orders. In the present work, we argue
that on electronic markets, profitable high frequency strategies using either limit
or market orders should not exist, imposing a linear relation between the bid-
ask spread S and the average impact of market orders. This, in turn justifies a
simple, but hitherto unnoticed, proportionality relation between the spread and
the volatility per trade.
In a large fraction of the economics literature [2, 3, 4, 5], liquidity providers
are described as market makers who earn their profit from the spread. The value
of the spread is non zero because this market making strategy has costs. Three
1Other determinants of liquidity discussed in the literature are the depth of the order book
and market resiliency, see [12, 13].
2
types of cost are discussed in the literature [11]:
• (i) order processing costs (which includes sheer profit for the market maker);
• (ii) adverse selection costs: liquidity takers may have superior information
on the future price of the stock, in which case the market maker loses
money;2
• (iii) inventory risk: market makers may temporarily accumulate large long
or short positions which are risky. If agents are risk-sensitive and have to
limit their exposure, this adds extra-costs.
Theoretical models that account for these costs typically introduce a rather large
amount of free parameters (such as risk-aversion, fraction of informed trades,
fraction of patient/ impatient traders, etc.) most of which cannot be measured
directly. In order to extract the different determinants of the spread from em-
pirical data, some drastic assumptions must be made. For example, assuming
the order flow to be short-ranged correlated, Huang and Stoll [8] find (using data
from 1992) that 90% of the spread is associated to order processing costs, and
not to adverse selection3. This is would mean rather comfortable profits for mar-
ket making4, and is a somewhat surprising conclusion since the spread on purely
electronic markets is found comparable to the spread in markets with specialists.
A related approach is that of [9], where the ratio of adverse selection to process-
ing costs was estimated to be in the range 35 − 50% on the nyse in 1990 (see
also [11] for similar numbers). We will review this theoretical framework below
and detail the similarities and differences with our own analysis; one particularly
crucial difference is the assumption that the order imbalance has short-ranged
correlations [8, 9], and therefore that market impact of a single trade is perma-
nent, in striking disagreement with empirical data, where the order flow is instead
found to be a long-memory process [15, 16], and single trade impact transient,
but decaying very slowly [15, 17]. The long-range correlation between trades, and
the corresponding temporal dependence of market impact will turn out to play
an important role in the following discussion.
On general grounds, both adverse selection and inventory risk imply a positive
correlation between the spread and the volatility of the traded asset. This makes
perfect intuitive sense, and the aim of the present paper is to clarify in detail
the origin of this relation. Positive correlation between spread and volatility is
indeed documented empirically (see e.g. [18, 4, 19, 11, 20, 21, 22, 23]), but is not
2This is also discussed as the free option trading problem in the literature, see e.g. [14] and
refs. therein.
3Adverse selection is even found to have, within this framework, a negative contribution to
the spread!
4Direct processing costs can be estimated to be at least ten times smaller than the spread,
in particular on electronic markets.
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particularly spectacular and stands as one among other reported correlations,
e.g., with traded volume, flow of limit orders, market capitalization, etc.[11].
Here, we want to argue theoretically, and demonstrate empirically on different
markets, that there is in fact a very strong correlation between the spread and the
volatility per trade, rather than with the volatility per unit time. Such a strong
relation was first noted on the case of France-Telecom [15], and independently on
the stocks of the ftse-100 [24], but no theoretical argument was given in favor
of this relation.
From a theoretical point of view, several statistical models of limit and mar-
ket order flows have been analyzed to understand the distribution of the bid-ask
spread, and relate its average value to flow and cancellation rates [3, 25, 26, 27,
29, 28, 30, 31]. Some models include strategic considerations in order placement
and look for a trade-off between the cost of delayed execution and that of imme-
diacy, but suppose that the price dynamics is bounded in a finite interval [26],
therefore neglecting the long term volatility of the price (see also [30, 31]). As
such, these finite band models have nothing to say about the spread-volatility
relationship. Another line of models discards all strategic components (“Zero
intelligence models”) and assume Poisson rates for limit orders, market orders
and cancellation [27, 29, 28].5 One can then compute both the average bid-ask
spread and the long-term volatility as a function of these Poisson rates, and com-
pare these predictions with empirical data [32]. The problem with such models
is that although the order flow itself is completely random, the persistence of the
order book leads to strong non-diffusive short term predictability of the price,
which would be very easily picked off by high frequency automated execution
machines. These programs search to optimize execution costs (see e.g. [10, 36])
by adequately conditioning the order flow (proportion of limit and market orders,
timing, aggressivity) and use any short-term predictability to do so. As a result
there are in fact very strong high frequency correlations in the order flow, coming
from the ‘hide and seek’ game played by buyers and sellers within the order book
[15, 16, 34]. A key observation is that for small tick stocks, the total available
volume in the order book at any instant in time is in fact extremely small, on the
order of 10−5− 10−4 of the market capitalization, or 10−3− 10−2 of the daily vol-
ume (see Table 2 in Appendix 2). Clearly, the reason for such a small outstanding
liquidity is that liquidity providers want to avoid giving a free trading option to
informed traders. As a consequence, liquidity takers must cut their total order
in small chunks; this creates the long term correlation in order flow [35]. But
since on electronic markets sophisticated buyers and sellers can trade using at
their best convenience either limit or market orders, the average cost of limit and
market orders should be very similar. If – say – market orders were on average
significantly more expensive than limit orders, more limit orders would be issued,
thereby reducing the spread and the cost of market orders, until an equilibrium
5More elaborated ‘weak intelligence’ models have been studied recently, see [33].
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is reached.6 That a competitive ecology between limit and market orders should
exist on order-driven markets was emphasized in [38, 15, 17]. However, as our
analysis reveals, this ecology turns out to be considerably more intricate than
anticipated by Handa & Schwartz [38].
In the following, we introduce the idea of infinitesimal strategies, participating
to a vanishing fraction of market or limit orders. Imposing that such strategies
lead at best to marginal profits motivates a linear relation between the instan-
taneous price impact of a market order and the bid-ask spread, which we check
empirically. Interestingly, we find that the profitability of these strategies de-
pend in a non trivial way on the time horizon over which they are implemented.
We show in particular that fast market making strategies can be profitable even
though the long-term average cost of limit orders is positive, a rather paradoxical
situation brought about by the presence of long-range correlations in the order
flow and the temporal structure of the impact function.
The linear relation between spread and impact in turn allows us to establish
a proportionality relation between the spread and volatility per trade, which
holds both across different stocks and for a given stock across time, on electronic
markets and on the nyse. This result shows that in a competitive electronic
market the bid-ask spread in fact mostly comes from “adverse selection”, provided
one extends this notion to account for the fact that trades can be uninformed but
still impact the price. What is relevant here is that any unexpected component
of the market order flow, whether it is truly informed or just random, impacts
the price and creates a cost for limit orders, which must be compensated by the
spread, as we now explain in detail.
2 Limit orders vs market orders and market im-
pact
2.1 A simple theoretical framework
We start by reviewing the theoretical framework proposed by Madhavan, Richard-
son and Roomans (mrr) in [9], which helps define various quantities and hone
in on relevant questions. We will call vi the volume of the ith market order, and
ǫi the sign of that market order (ǫ = +1 for a buy and ǫ = −1 for a sell). The
assumptions of the model are (i) that all trades have the same volume vi = v and
(ii) the ǫi’s are generated by a Markov process with correlation ρ, which means
that the average value of ǫi conditioned on the past only depends on ǫi−1 and is
given by:
〈ǫi〉|ǫi−1 = ρǫi−1, (1)
6Data from brokers VWAP machines indeed show that the fraction of issued market orders
is close to 50%.
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where 〈...〉 denotes averaging. The case ρ = 0 corresponds to independent trade
signs, whereas ρ > 0 describes positive autocorrelations of trades. Note that in
this model, correlations decay exponentially:
C(ℓ) = 〈ǫiǫi+ℓ〉 = ρℓ. (2)
The mrr model assumes that the ‘true’ price pi evolves both because of random
external shocks (or news) and because of trade impact. It is natural to postulate
that both external news and surprise in order flow should move the price. Since
the surprise at the ith trade is given by ǫi − ρǫi−1, mrr write the following
evolution equation for the price:
pi+1 − pi = ξi + θ[ǫi − ρǫi−1], (3)
where ξ is the shock component, with variance 〈ξ2i 〉 = Σ2, and θ measures trade
impact, assumed to be constant (all trades are assumed to have the same volume).
Since market makers cannot guess the surprise of the next trade, they post a bid
price bi and an ask price ai given by:
ai = pi + θ[1− ρǫi−1] + φ; bi = pi + θ[−1− ρǫi−1]− φ, (4)
where φ is the extra compensation claimed the market maker, covering processing
costs and the shock component risk. The above rule ensures no ex-post regrets
for the market maker. The spread is therefore S ≡ a− b = 2(θ+ φ), whereas the
midpoint m ≡ (a + b)/2 immediately before the ith trade is given by:
mi = pi − θρǫi−1. (5)
These equations allow to compute several important quantities for the following
discussion, although not explicitely considered by mrr. The first one is the lagged
impact function introduced in [15, 17]:
Rℓ = 〈ǫi · (mℓ+i −mi)〉, (6)
which is found, within the mrr model, to increase from R1 = θ(1−ρ) to R∞ = θ
(See Appendix 1 and Fig. 1). Due to correlations between trades, the long time
impact is therefore enhanced compared to the short term impact by a factor:
λ∞ =
1
1− C1 , (7)
where C1 = C(ℓ = 1) = ρ in the mrr model, but the above relation is more
general (see Appendix I).
The second quantity is the mid-point volatility, defined as:
σ2ℓ =
1
ℓ
〈(mℓ+i −mi)2〉, (8)
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which is easily computed to be:7
σ21 = R21 + Σ2; σ2∞ =
1 + ρ
1− ρR
2
1 + Σ
2; 〈ξ2i 〉 = Σ2. (9)
Within the above interpretation, the mrr model leads to the following simple
relations between spread, impact and volatility per trade:
S = 2λ∞R1 + 2φ σ21 = R21 + Σ2, (10)
relations which we generalize and test empirically in the following. From the
data presented in mrr, one observes that φ was rather large on the nyse in
1990: φ/λ∞R1 ∼ 1− 2.
Note that in the simplest case of independent trade signs (ρ = 0), the impact
function is time independent. In the absence of extra compensation for the market
makers, φ = 0 and the above equation reduces toR1 = S/2. In economical terms,
this last equality has a very simple meaning: it indicates that on average, the new
mid-price after the transaction mi+1 = mi + ǫiR is equal to the last transaction
price mi + ǫiS/2, and therefore that R1 = S/2 is precisely the condition where
both market orders and limit orders have zero ex-post cost. This is more generally
the meaning of the mrr relation, Eq. (10): the transaction price is exactly equal
to the expected long term value of the mid-point.
It is interesting to discuss the cost of limit orders CL slightly differently. Sup-
pose one wants to trade at a random instant in time. Compared to the initial
mid-point value, the average execution cost of an infinitesimal buy limit order is
given by:
CL = 1
2
(
−S
2
)
+
1
2
(
R1 + C+L
)
: (11)
with probability 1/2, the order is executed right away, S/2 below the mid-point;
otherwise, the mid-point moves on average by a quantity R1, to which must be
added the cost of a limit order conditioned to the last trade being a buy, C+L , for
which a similar equation can be obtained:
C+L =
1− ρ
2
(
−S
2
)
+
1 + ρ
2
(
R+1 + C++L
)
, (12)
with obvious notations. Since the mrr model is Markovian, one has R+1 = R1
and C++L = C+L , so that:
C+L = −
S
2
+
1 + ρ
1− ρR1. (13)
Plugging this last relation in Eq. (11), we finally find:
CL = −S
2
+
2
1− ρR1. (14)
7The is an extra contribution to σ21 coming from any high-frequency noise component that
we neglect here, coming from decimalisation, small volumes at bid/ask, etc. See [9, 15] and
footnote 18 below.
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Imposing that CL ≡ 0, one recovers the mrr relation between the spread and the
asymptotic impact (Eq. (10) with φ = 0). Note, however, the cost of a market
order compared to the initial mid-point value is S/2 within the mrr model – but
of course the order is still executed at the ‘right’ long term value of the stock.
2.2 Real markets are more complicated
The above model, although suggestive and capturing the essence of the correlation
between spread, impact and volatility, is however not fully satisfactory since it
completely neglects the very broad distribution of traded volumes (often found to
be log-normal, or power-law tailed) and, more importantly, the non-Markovian,
long ranged correlation of the trade signs, which is found to decay as [15, 16]:8
C(ℓ) = 〈ǫiǫi+ℓ〉 ≈ c0
ℓγ
, γ < 1 (15)
instead of the fast, exponential decay assumed in the mrr model. Because the ex-
ponent γ is found to be less than unity, the correlation function is not integrable,
which technically makes the series of trade signs a long-memory process. As
emphasized in [15, 17], this imposes a number of non-trivial constraints on price
impact for the returns to remain uncorrelated while the order flow is strongly
auto-correlated. In particular, simple models (such as Huang and Stoll’s [8, 11])
where price changes include a term proportional to ǫi would lead to strong super-
diffusion (trends) of prices on the long run [15], in disagreement with empirical
data.
The volume-dependent lagged impact is now defined as:9
Rℓ(v) = 〈ǫi · (mℓ+i −mi)〉|vi=v . (16)
In the mrr model, v takes a single value and Rℓ(v) reduces to the previously
defined quantity. The function Rℓ(v) was studied in detail in [15]. To a good level
of approximation, the following factorization property is found to hold: Rℓ(v) ≈
R(ℓ)f(v), where f(v) is a strongly concave function, and R(ℓ) an increasing
function of ℓ that varies by a factor of ∼ 2 when ℓ increases from 1 to several
thousands (corresponding to a few days of trading).10 The shape ofR(ℓ), averaged
over a collection of different stocks of the pse, is shown in Fig. 1, and compared
with the simple form assumed in the mrr model (see caption for more details).
Perhaps more importantly, the enhancement factor λ∞ is found empirically to be
8These long ranged correlations were also noted in e.g. [21, 37], but the detailed shape of
the tail of C(ℓ) was not investigated, and its long-memory nature not discussed.
9In the definition of R, care has been taken to remove any long term trend of the mid-point.
In any case, since 〈ǫ〉 is close to zero, this trend contribution would very nearly vanish.
10The true asymptotic behaviour of R(ℓ) for longer horizons is difficult to determine empiri-
cally due to statistical noise, and might in fact be stock dependent, see [17] for a discussion of
this point.
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substantially larger than predicted by Eq. (7). For example, on the pool of 68
pse stocks studied below, we find, averaged over all stocks, λ∞ ≈ 1.75 whereas
1/(1− C1) ≈ 1.32 (see Table 2 of Appendix 2). The difference between the two
will turn out to play a crucial role in the following.
1 10 100
 l
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
 
R
 R (PSE)
 MRR model
Figure 1: Average over 68 pse stocks of the impact function R(ℓ) as a function of
ℓ (plain line). The average is performed by rescaling the individual R(ℓ) such that
R(ℓ = 1) ≡ 1, and by rescaling ℓ by the average daily number of trades and multiplying
by 100. Dotted line: prediction of the mrr model with ρ = 3/7, such that λ∞ = 1.75.
The discrepancy with empirical data shows the importance of correctly accounting for
long-range correlations in order flow.
2.3 Market order strategies
In this section and below, we want to show how the simple relations derived in
the mrr model can be extended and tested in the general case of fluctuating
volumes and long-ranged correlation of trade signs. A first idea is to measure
empirically the average execution cost of market-orders. One can define the ex-
post cost CM(T ) the difference between the transaction price at (trade-)time i
and the mid-point price at time i + T later, with T ≫ 1 but still much smaller
than the typical horizon of the trading strategy itself (a few days or more), in
order not to mix in the quality of the decision to trade. The above definition of
execution cost marks the trade to market after T and is referred to the realized
spread in the literature [41, 11]. The volume weighted averaged cost (over N
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trades) of a single market order over horizon T is therefore:11
CM(T ) = 1
N〈v〉
N∑
i=1
ǫivi(mi + ǫi
Si
2
−mi+T ) ≡ 〈vS〉
2〈v〉 −
〈vRT (v)〉
〈v〉 . (17)
The choice T ≫ 1 allows us to use the asymptotic value of R, R(ℓ ≫ 1) ≈
λ∞R(1), where we have introduced a factor λ∞ in conformity with the notation
of the previous section. Using the factorization property of Rℓ(v), we finally
obtain for the average cost of a single market order:
CM(T ≫ 1) = 〈vS〉
2〈v〉 − λ∞
〈vR1(v)〉
〈v〉 , (18)
meaning, as intuitively clear, that this cost is positive when spreads are large,
but may become negative if the total price impact λ∞R1 is large. In the plane
x = 〈vR1(v)〉/〈v〉, y = 〈vS〉/〈v〉 (which will repeatedly be used below to represent
empirical data) the condition C(T ≫ 1) = 0 defines a straight line of slope 2λ∞
separating an upper region where market orders are on average costly, from a
region where single market orders are favored: see Fig. 2.
The above computation suggests an upper bound on the spread, which we
establish more rigorously in the next section. For larger spreads, the positive
average cost of market order would deter their use; limit orders would then pile up
and reduce the spread. What would happen if the spread was below the red line of
slope 2λ∞ in Fig. 2? Naively, market orders have a negative cost in that region,
and one might be able to devise profitable strategies based solely on market
orders. The idea would be to try to benefit from the impact term R∞ in the
above balance equation. The growth of Rℓ ultimately comes from the correlation
between trades, i.e. the succession of buy (sell) trades that typically follow a
given buy (sell) market order. The simplest ‘copy-cat’ strategy which one can
rigorously test on empirical data is to place a market order with vanishing volume
fraction (not to affect the subsequent history of quotes and trades), immediately
following another market order. This strategy suffers on average from the impact
of the initial trade, used as a guide to guess the direction of the market. Therefore,
the profit GCC of such a copy-cat strategy, marked to market after a long time
and neglecting further unwinding costs, is reduced to:12
GCC = [λ∞ − 1]〈vR1(v)〉〈v〉 −
〈vS〉
2〈v〉 . (19)
11Note that this definition neglects the fact that one single large market order may trigger
transactions at several different prices, up the order book ladder, and pay more than the nominal
spread. Nevertheless this situation is empirically quite rare on the markets we are concerned
with, and corresponds to only a few percents of all cases [42].
12A more rigorous estimate of the gain of a copy-cat strategy participating to all the trades
can be obtained following the method outlined in the next section.
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Imposing that this gain is non-positive, one obtains a lower line in the plane x, y,
of slope 2(λ∞−1). Only below this green line can the above infinitesimal copy-cat
strategy be profitable. We therefore expect markets to operate above this line and
below the red line of slope 2λ∞. Note however that market orders below the 2λ∞
line are not necessarily favorable in practice, since the cost for executing a series
of market orders (which is the typical situation faced by large investors, since
the outstanding liquidity is, as noted above, always quite small) must include
the impact of past trades and this increases their average cost. Hence, the slope
of the effective zero-cost line for a series of market orders is indeed smaller than
2λ∞. Similarly, the long-time impact of an isolated market order, uncorrelated
with the order flow, is in fact very small [15]. These isolated market orders thus
also have a positive cost, equal to half the spread. The only way to benefit from
the average impact Rℓ is to free-ride on a wave of orders launched by others, as
in the above copy-cat strategy. Let us now take the complementary point of view
of limit orders and determine the region of profitable market making strategies.
0 5 10 15
 < R1 v >v/< v >v 
0
10
20
30
40
 
<
 S
 v
 >
v
/<
 v
 >
v
 
Market orders
are costly
No profitable market−making
2λοο 2(λοο−1)
2/(1−C1)
2λβ
PMM
PCC
Figure 2: General “phase diagram” in the plane x = 〈vR1(v)〉/〈v〉, y = 〈vS〉/〈v〉,
showing several regions: (i) above the red line of slope 2λ∞, market orders are costly (on
average) and market making is profitable; (ii) below the blue line of slope ≈ 2/(1−C1),
limit orders are costly and no market-making strategy is profitable; (iii) above the black
line of slope 2λβ, market making on time scale T (or faster) is profitable (PMM); (iv)
below the green line of slope 2(λ∞ − 1), copy-cat strategies can be profitable (PCC).
Since neither market orders nor liquidity providing should be systematically penalized
for markets to ensure steady trading, we expect that markets should operate in the
‘neutral wedge’ in between the blue and the red line. Competition between liquidity
providers should push the market towards the blue line. Since copy-cat strategies
should not be profitable either, the PCC green line cannot lie above this blue line.
Note that the blue, red and black lines all coincide within the mrr model.
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2.4 An infinitesimal market making strategy
Our aim is to discuss the profitability of providing liquidity to the market for-
malizing the idea of infinitesimal strategies used in the previous section. To do
so we compute the gain of a simple market making strategy which consists in
participating to a vanishing fraction of all trades through limit orders. The sim-
plest strategy is to consider a market maker with a certain time horizon T who
provides an infinitesimal fraction ϕ of the total available liquidity. As illustrated
by Eq. (17), the cost incurred by the market maker comes from market impact:
the price move between 0 and T is anti-correlated with the accumulated posi-
tion. When the crowd buys, the price goes up while the market making strategy
accumulates a short position which would be costly to buy back at time T , and
vice-versa. More precisely, we consider a steady-state market making strategy
(which avoids explicit unwinding costs). The strategy is such that volume of-
fered dynamically depends on the accumulated position, which insures that the
inventory is always bounded. We choose the tendered fraction ϕ to be given by:
ϕi = ϕ0(1 + αViǫ), where Vi is the (signed) position accumulated up to time i
−,
and ǫ = +1 for orders placed at the ask and ǫ = −1 for orders placed at the bid.
This mean-reverting strategy insures that the typical position is always bounded.
One can now use this strategy for an arbitrary long time T ; its profit & loss is
simply given by:
GL =
T−1∑
i=0
ϕiǫivi(mi + ǫi
Si
2
). (20)
For large T , one can replace this expression by:
GL = T 〈ϕiǫivi(mi + ǫiSi
2
)〉 (21)
with O(T 0) corrections due to the residual position at T . Discarding the con-
straint ϕi ≥ 0 and neglecting volume-volume correlations, which are much smaller
than sign-sign correlations [15, 16], we finally find:
GL(β)
Tϕ0〈v〉 =
〈vS〉
2〈v〉
[
1− 1− β
β
∞∑
ℓ=1
βℓC(ℓ)
]
− 1− β
β
∞∑
ℓ=1
βℓ
〈vRℓ(v)〉
〈v〉 , (22)
where β = 1−αϕ0〈v〉 fixes the typical time scale of the market making strategy.
The above expression is exact in the limit α→ 0, and only approximate otherwise.
When β → 0 (fast market making), Eq.(22) reduces to:
GL(β → 0)
Tϕ0〈v〉 ≈
〈vS〉
2〈v〉 [1− C1]−
〈vR1(v)〉
〈v〉 , (23)
whereas β → 1, corresponding to slow market making, yields:
GL(β → 1)
Tϕ0〈v〉 =
〈vS〉
2〈v〉 −
〈vR∞(v)〉
〈v〉 . (24)
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Setting GL(β) to zero leads to a linear relation between spread and impact:
〈vS〉
〈v〉 = 2λβ
〈vR1(v)〉
〈v〉 . (25)
Using the empirical shape of Rℓ and C(ℓ), the slope 2λβ is found to increase
between ≈ 2/(1 − C1) and 2λ∞ when β increases. Contrarily to market orders
which benefit from the growth of the impact Rℓ with time, slow market making
is suboptimal. When β → 1, λβ → λ∞ and the lower limit of profitability
of very slow market making is precisely the red line of Fig. 2 where market
orders become profitable. Faster strategies correspond to smaller values of λβ,
closer to 1/(1 − C1), leading to an extended region of profitability for market
making. From the assumption that the above market making strategy for any
value of β should be at best marginally profitable (since one might find more
sophisticated strategies, which take full advantage of the correlations between
signs and volumes), we finally obtain the following bound between spread and
impact:
〈vS〉
〈v〉 ≤
2
1− C1
〈vR1(v)〉
〈v〉 , (26)
defining the blue line of slope 2/(1−C1) in the x, y plane of Fig. 2. Consistently
with the mrr model, when λ∞ = 1/(1 − C1), the blue and red line of Fig. 2
exactly coincide. Using that fact that Rn+1 ≤ R(n−1)+1 , a simple generalisation of
the argument presented at the end of Sect. 2.1 allows one to show that the cost
of limit orders is indeed negative above the blue line.
2.5 Theoretical analysis: conclusions
Eqs. (18,19,26) and the resulting microstructural “phase diagram” of Fig. 2
are our central results. These equations show that the cost or profitability of
infinitesimal market and limit order strategies can be estimated from empirical
data alone, without having to make any further assumption on the fraction of
informed trades, the correlation between trades, etc. In order to proceed, we
made two approximations. Firstly, we assumed that these strategies could be
made infinitesimal, which allows us to neglect their impact on the price dynamics.
In practice, trades occur in discrete volume, and strictly speaking the assumption
of infinitely small volumes does not hold. However, the volume of typical trades
is much larger than the minimum size, which suggests that this approximation
is accurate. Secondly, we neglected all direct transaction costs, which obviously
affect profitability. These costs are in general very small compared to the spread,
and can therefore also reasonably be neglected.
Our main result is that profitability, perhaps surprisingly, depends on the
frequency of these strategies, a result closely related to the anomalous time de-
pendence of the impact function. Market orders are favored at low frequencies,
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when impact has fully developed, whereas limit orders are favored at high fre-
quencies, where impact is still limited and the execution probability significant.
Our analysis delineates, in the impact-spread plane, a central wedge bounded
from above by a slope 2λ∞ and from below by a slope ≈ 2/(1−C1), within which
both market orders and limit orders are viable. In the upper wedge, market
orders would always be costly and would be substituted by limit orders. In the
lower wedge, market making strategies, even at high frequencies, would never eke
out any profit. Such a market would not be sustainable in the absence of any
incentive to provide liquidity. But if the spread happened to fall in this region,
the enhanced flow of market orders would soon reopen the gap between bid and
ask.
Our next assumption is that simple statistical strategies must have negative
or marginal profit. These is quite reasonable since high-frequency strategies carry
relatively small risks. Applying this idea to market making strategies, we con-
clude that competition between liquidity providers will push the spreads close to
the lower limit, corresponding to the blue line of slope ≈ 2/(1 − C1) in Fig. 2.
Now, since market taking (copy-cat) strategies should not be profitable either,
the green line of slope 2(λ∞−1) should necessarily lie below the blue line, leading
to the following inequality on the asymptotic impact enhancement factor λ∞:
1 ≤ λ∞ ≤ 1 + 1
1− C1 , (27)
where the lower bound comes from the existence of correlation between trades
(see Eq. (7)). In other words, the impact function cannot grow more than roughly
twice its initial value, otherwise statistical arbitrage would set in. Interestingly,
our data is compatible with the above bound; in practice the blue and green lines
turn out to be not very far from each other.
Finally, we note that market microstructure studies insist on large inventory
risks being an important determinant of the bid-ask spread. However, large
inventories correspond to long horizons and slow market making. Our analysis
above shows that accumulating inventories on a long horizon is not only risky,
but may also be extremely costly on average. When λ∞ > 1/(1 − C1), market
making on large horizons is significantly more costly than on short horizons, by
an amount proportional to the spread itself. This is a very strong effect, which
makes the existence of low-frequency market makers very unlikely. Therefore,
inventory risk by itself should not be important in determining the value of the
spread, at least on electronic markets.
In conclusion, we expect that electronic markets should operate in the vicinity
of the blue line of Fig. 2, imposing a linear relation between spread and market
impact of slope close to 2/(1−C1). This is what we test on empirical data in the
following section.
14
3 Comparison with empirical data
3.1 Small tick electronic markets
We first consider small tick electronic markets, such as the Paris Stock Exchange
(pse) or Index Futures. The case of large tick stocks is different since in this case
the spread is (nearly) always one tick, with huge volumes at both the bid and
the ask. The case of such markets will be considered below.
We studied extensively the set of the 68 most liquid stocks of the pse during
the year 2002. The summary statistics describing these stocks is given in Ap-
pendix 2. From the Trades and Quotes data, one has access the the bid-ask just
before each trade, from which one can obtain the sign and the volume of each
trade (depending on whether the trade happened at the ask or at the bid) and
the mid-point just before the trade. From this information, one computes the
quantities of interest, such as the instantaneous impact function R1, the one-lag
correlation C1, the spread S and λ∞. Note that we have removed ‘block trades’,
which appear as transactions with volumes larger than what is available at the
best price that are not followed by a change of quotes. Clearly, these block trades
are outside the scope of the above arguments; in any case they represent typically
a 5 − 10% fraction of the total number of trades and do not significantly affect
the following results.
We test the above ideas in two different ways – for a given stock across time,
and across all different stocks. Since both the spread and impact vary with
time, one can measure ‘instantaneous’ quantities by averaging for a given stock
〈Sv〉/〈v〉 and 〈vR1(v)〉/〈v〉 over a number of successive trades. In the example
of Fig. 3, each point corresponds to an average over 10000 non overlapping
trades, corresponding to 2 days of trading in the case of France Telecom in 2002.
Doing so we obtain quantities that vary by a factor 5 that allows us to test the
linear dependence predicted by Eqs.(19,26). For France Telecom, we find that
λ∞ is close to the average value 1.85 shown in Fig. 1. Therefore 2(λ∞ − 1)<≈ 2
in this case, meaning that copy-cat market making strategies are impossible, as
expected for highly liquid stocks. We also find that C1 ≈ 0.14 (see Appendix
2). Our results shown in Fig.3 are in good agreement with the above theoretical
bounds, even for averages over rather short time scales. A linear fit with zero
intercept gives a slope equal to 2.14, to be compared with 2/(1 − C1) ≈ 2.32,
meaning that providing liquidity is hardly rewarded at all for this very liquid,
small tick stock. In fact, if the intercept of the linear fit is left free, its value
(which should equal the ‘processing costs’ 2φ in the mrr model) is found to be
slightly negative.
We also test Eq.(26) cross-sectionally in Fig. 4, using the above 68 different
stocks of the pse. The relative values of the spread and the average impact also
varies by a factor 5 between the different stocks, which enables to test the linear
relations (19,26). Once again we find a good agreement with the predicted bound,
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Figure 3: France Telecom in 2002. Each point corresponds to a pair (y = 〈vS〉/〈v〉,
x = 〈vR1〉/〈v〉), computed by averaging over 10000 non overlapping trades (∼ two
trading days). Both quantities are expressed in basis points. We also show the different
bounds, Eqs. (18,19,26), and a linear fit that gives a slope of 2.14. The correlation is
R2 = 0.93.
and the linear fit with zero intercept gives a slope of 2.86, while 〈2/(1− C1)〉 ≈
2.64. Hence, fast market making strategies are on average weakly profitable on
the pse. However, the intercept of a two-parameter regression is very slightly
negative, showing that no order processing costs component can be detected on
these fully electronic markets.
It is also interesting to analyze small tick Futures markets, for which the
typical spread is ten times smaller than on stock markets. We have studied a
series of small tick Index Futures in 2005 (except the mib for which the data
is 2004), again both as a function of time and across the 7 indexes of our set.
For most contracts, the value of C1 is quite large (〈C1〉 ≈ 0.42) except for the
hangseng where C1 ≈ 0.035. Results are shown in Fig. 5; the bounds are again
quite well obeyed both across contracts and across time, even when the time
averaging is restricted to only 1000 consecutive trades. This shows that on these
highly liquid contracts, where the transaction rate as high as a few per second,
the equilibrium between spread and impact is reached very quickly.
3.2 NYSE stocks
The case of the nyse is quite interesting since the market is still ruled by special-
ists, who however compete to provide liquidity with other market participants
placing limit orders. We again test Eqs.(18,26) cross sectionally, using the set of
16
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Figure 4: 68 stocks of the Paris Stock Exchange in 2002. Each point corresponds to
a pair (y = 〈vS〉/〈v〉, x = 〈vR1〉/〈v〉), computed by averaging over the year. Both
quantities are expressed in basis points. We also show the different bounds, Eqs.
(18,19,26), and a linear fit that gives a slope of 2.86, while 〈2/(1 − C1)〉 ≈ 2.64. The
correlation is R2 = 0.90.
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Figure 5: Small tick Index Futures in 2005: cac, dax, ftse, ibex, mib, smi,
hangseng. Each black square corresponds to a pair (y = 〈vS〉/〈v〉, x = 〈R1v〉/〈v〉),
computed by averaging over the year, while small crosses are computed by averaging
over 1000 non overlapping trades on the hangseng futures. Both quantities are ex-
pressed in basis points. We also show the bounds, Eqs. (26,18), with 1/(1 − C1) ≈ 1
(dotted blue line), corresponding to the hangseng, and 1/(1 − C1) ≈ 1.72 (full blue
line), corresponding to the average over all other futures.
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the 155 most actively traded stocks on the nyse in 2005.13 We use the quoted
bid-ask posted by the specialist. We have first determined the average impact
function R(ℓ), which has a shape roughly similar to Fig. 1, although the asymp-
totic plateau value is slightly larger, leading to λ∞ ≈ 2.1. On the other hand,
1/(1− C1) is also slightly larger, equal to 1.39.
Plotting the data in the spread-impact plane, we now find that the empirical
results cluster around to the upper red line limit where market orders become
costly. The regression has a significantly larger slope of 3.3 and now a positive
intercept 2φ ≈ 1.3 basis points.14 This suggests that, perhaps not surprisingly,
the existence of monopoly rents on nyse: market makers post spreads that are
systematically over-estimated compared to the situation in electronic markets,
with a non-zero extrapolated spread 2φ for zero market impact. This result is in
agreement with the study of Harris and Hasbrouck performed in the early 90’s on
the nyse [39], which showed that limit orders were more favorable than market
orders, and also with Handa and Schwartz [40], who showed that pure limit order
strategies were indeed profitable. On the other hand, the value of the regression
slope on the purely electronic pse show that pure limit order strategies can only
be marginally profitable. We have checked that using the traded spread instead
of the quoted spread does not change appreciably the above conclusions.
3.3 The case of large tick electronic markets
A priori, the string of arguments leading to Eq. (26) does not directly apply in
the case where the tick size is large. In that case the spread S is most of the
time stuck to its minimum value, i.e. one tick, while the size of the queue q at
the bid and at the ask tends to be extremely large (see e.g. Appendix 2, Table
3). Because of the large value of the spread, limit orders appear to be favorable,
but huge limit order volumes accumulate as liquidity providers attempt to take
advantage of the spread. The size of the queue q at the bid or at the ask is thus
much larger than the typical value of the traded volume at each transaction v:
v/q ≈ 0.01 (see Table 3), to be compared with v/q ≈ 0.2− 0.3 (see Appendix 2,
Table 2) for smaller tick stocks. Therefore, the simple market making strategy
considered above, which assumes that one can participate to a small fraction
of all transactions, cannot be implemented. We thus expect that the spread
on these markets will be substantially larger than predicted by the bound Eq.
(26), because the competition between liquidity providers, that acts to reduce
the spread, cannot fully operate. We indeed find that the ratio between 〈vS〉 and
〈vR1〉 is large for large tick stocks. For example, in the case of Ericsson, during
the period March-November 2004, for which the tick size is ∼ 50 bp, we find
13The list of the 155 names is available on request.
14This is five times smaller than the average spread, leading to φ/θ ∼ 0.25, much smaller
than the result φ/θ ∼ 1 − 2 found within mrr model in 1990, or a similar value reported in
[11].
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Figure 6: 155 stocks of the nyse 2005. Each point corresponds to a pair (y = 〈vS〉/〈v〉,
x = 〈vR1〉/〈v〉), computed by averaging over the year. Both quantities are expressed in
basis points. We also show our bounds, Eqs. (18,19,26). The data shows clearly that
market orders are less favorable than in the electronic Paris Bourse. The regression
now has a positive intercept of 1.3 bp with an R2 = 0.87.
〈vS〉/〈vR1〉 ≈ 4.5. However, we also find on the same data that λ∞ ≈ 4.5 ± 1.,
meaning that market orders are in fact not systematically unfavored in these
large tick electronic markets. In fact, all data points are found to lie between our
bounds, Eqs. (18,26), but indeed significantly higher than the blue line of Fig. 2
in this case.
3.4 Comparison with empirical data: conclusion
Our empirical analysis shows that on liquid markets, an approximate symmetry
between limit and market orders indeed holds, in the sense that neither market
orders nor limit orders are systematically unfavorable. Markets operate in the
‘neutral wedge’ of Fig. 2.
For fully electronic markets, competition for providing liquidity is efficient
in keeping the spread close to its lowest value, marginally compensating impact
cost. There is therefore hardly any room for market making strategies. Although
the cost of isolated market orders is found to be negative, the empirically estab-
lished proximity of the blue and green line in Fig. 2 means that there is no room
for simple market taking strategies either. In this discussion, time horizon and
long range correlations in the order flow play an important role, overlooked in
previous studies [8, 9, 11]: somewhat paradoxically, liquidity providers as a whole
offer average negative costs to market orders but high frequency market making
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strategies still manage to get (marginally) compensated. Our analysis shows that
the ecology between liquidity takers and liquidity providers turns out to be con-
siderably more complex than anticipated by Handa & Schwartz [38]: when costs
are computed on large time scale, limit orders are in average costly. This implies
that a significant fraction of limit orders cannot be due to market makers, since
limit orders as a whole are in arrears. The common assumption that limit orders
can be attributed to liquidity providers compensated by the spread cannot be
correct in electronic markets. This argument can only concern a small fraction of
high-frequency market makers, whose existence is nevertheless crucial to prevent
liquidity crises.
On the nyse, spreads appears to be significantly larger: isolated market orders
are now marginally costly. A linear relation between spread and impact still
applies, albeit with a larger slope and a residual intercept, corresponding to
market maker monopoly rents, which are absent in electronic markets.
4 Liquidity vs. volatility
4.1 Theoretical considerations
Consider again the mrr model discussed above, which predicts a simple relation
between volatility and impact, Eq. (9). Using the relation between spread and
impact established above, this suggests a direct link between volatility per trade
and spread, which we motivate and test in this section.
By definition of the volatility per trade σ21 = 〈(mℓ+1 − mℓ)2〉 and of the
instantaneous impact r1,i ≡ (mi+1 −mi).ǫi, one has as an identity:
σ21 ≡ 〈r21,i〉. (28)
The instantaneous impact r1,i is expected to fluctuate over time for several rea-
sons. First, the volume of the trade, the volume in the book and the spread
strongly fluctuate with time. For example, on the pse, the spread has a distribu-
tion close to an exponential, hence one has 〈S2〉 ≈ 2〈S〉2 (see Table 2, Appendix
2).15 Large impact fluctuations may also arise from quote revisions due to addi-
tion or cancellation of some limit orders. Second, there might also be important
news affecting the ‘fundamental price’ of the stock. These result in large, instan-
taneous jumps of the mid-point, unrelated to the trading activity itself. In order
to account for both effects, we write, generalizing the above mrr relation:
σ21 = aR21 + Σ2, (29)
where R1 ≡ 〈R1(v)〉 is the average impact after one trade, a is a coefficient
measuring the variance of impact fluctuations and Σ2 is the news component of
15The distribution appears to be a power-law on other markets [33], but this is irrelevant for
the following discussion.
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the volatility (see Section 2.1). A specific model for Eq. (29) was worked out in
[15], and tested on France-Telecom (see also [44]). Here, we establish that this
relation holds quite precisely across different stocks of the pse, with a correlation
of R2 = 0.96 (see Fig. (7)). Perhaps surprisingly, the exogenous ‘news volatility’
contribution Σ2 is found to be small. (The intercept of the best affine regression is
even found to be slightly negative). This could be related to the observation made
in Farmer et al. [42] that for most price jumps, some limit orders are canceled to
slowly and get ‘grabbed’ by fast market orders, which means that most of these
events are already included in R1, in line with our general statements on the
approximate symmetry between limit and market orders.16 In the following, we
will therefore neglect Σ2, as suggested by Fig. (7): in this sense the volatility of
the stocks can be mostly attributed to market activity and trade impact. This is
in agreement with the conclusions of Lyons and Evans on currency markets [43];
see also the discussion in [15, 37].
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Figure 7: Plot of σ21 vs. R21, showing that the linear relation Eq. (29) holds quite
precisely with Σ2 = 0 and a ≈ 10.9. (The intercept of the best affine regression is even
found to be slightly negative). Data here corresponds to the 68 stocks of the pse in
2002. The correlation is very high: R2 = 0.96.
Our final assumption is that of universality, i.e. when the tick size is small
enough and the typical number of shares traded is large enough, all stocks within
the same market should behave identically up to a rescaling of the average spread
and the average volume. In particular we assume that the statistics of (i) the vol-
16One could argue that our results simply show that the news volatility Σ itself is proportional
to R1 and thus to the spread S. However, there is no reason why this should a priori be the
case. For example, a model where jumps of typical amplitude J have a small probability per
trade p leads to Σ =
√
pJ , whereas the cost of such jumps, contributing to S, is pJ ≪ Σ.
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ume of market orders (ii) the spread S and (iii) the impactR, and the correlations
between these quantities are independent on the stock when these quantities are
normalized by their average value.17 This universality implies that:
〈vS〉 = b〈v〉〈S〉, (30)
where b is stock independent. Similarly,
〈vR1(v)〉v = b′〈v〉R1, (31)
where b′ is also stock independent. Note that this assumption is consistent with
the empirical observation of [45], where the impact function R1(v) for different
US stocks can indeed be rescaled onto a unique Master curve by a proper scaling
of both the x and y axis. We test Eqs. (30,31) in Fig. 8 in the case of the Paris
Stock Exchange, from which we extract b ≈ 1.02 and b′ ≈ 1.80. Interestingly, we
find that the volume and the spread are nearly uncorrelated (b = 1), whereas the
volume traded and the impact are correlated (b′ > 1), as expected.
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Figure 8: Plot of 〈vX〉v/〈v〉 vs. 〈X〉, where X is either the spread S or the instan-
taneous impact R1(v) (multiplied by a factor 5 for clarity). The quality of the linear
regression tests our universality assumption, which is excellent for S (R2 = 0.98) and
satisfactory for R1 (R2 = 0.9). The value of b ≈ 1.02 and b′ ≈ 1.80 are given by the
slope of these regressions. Data here corresponds to the 68 stocks of the pse in 2002.
Therefore, using Eq. (26) as an equality (as suggested by the empirical results
of Section 3), and Eqs. (29,30,31), we obtain the main result of this section:
〈S〉 = c σ1, (32)
17The universality of the shape of the order book was indeed checked to hold rather well in
[29].
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where c is a stock independent numerical constant, which can be expressed using
the constants introduced above as c = 2λb′/
√
ab. This very simple relation
between volatility per trade and average spread was noted in [15, 24], and we
present further data in the next section to support this conjecture. Therefore,
the constraints that (i) optimized high frequency execution strategies impose that
the price is diffusive (see [15, 17]), and (ii) the cost of limit and market orders
are nearly equal [Eqs.(18,26)], lead to a simple relation between liquidity and
volatility. As an important remark, note that the above relation is not expected
to hold for the volatility per unit time σ, since it involves an extra stock-dependent
and time-dependent quantity, namely the the trading frequency ν, through:
σ = σ1
√
ν. (33)
We will discuss this issue further in Section 5.
4.2 Comparison with empirical data
Using the same data sets as in Sections 3.1 and 3.2, we now test empirically
the predicted linear relation between spread and volatility per trade, Eq. (32).
The average spread 〈S〉 is defined as the average distance between bid and ask
immediately before each trade (and not as the average over all posted quotes).
The volatility per trade is defined as the root mean square of the trade by trade
return.18 Our results for the Paris Stock Exchange are shown in Figs 9 and 10. We
see that Eq. (32) describes the data very well, with R2s over 0.9. Interestingly,
using the results obtained above across the pse stocks, we have a′ ≈ 10.9, b ≈
1.02, b′ ≈ 0.53, λ ≈ 1.43, leading to c ≈ 1.53, in close correspondence with the
direct regression result c ≈ 1.58. Similar results are obtained for Index futures
(Figs. 11-a & b) or for the nyse (Fig. 12), with values of c which are all very
similar c ∼ 1.2 − 1.6. We have also checked that there is an average intra-day
pattern which is followed in close correspondence both by 〈S〉 and σ1: spreads
are larger at the opening of the market and decline throughout the day. Note
that the trading frequency ν increases as time elapses, which, using Eq. (33),
explains the familiar U-shaped pattern of the volatility per unit time.
5 Discussion and conclusion
The main theoretical result of this paper is the possibility to express the cost of
market orders and the profit of infinitesimal market-making/taking strategies in
terms of directly observable quantities, namely the spread and the lag-dependent
18Since prices are very close to random walks, defining the volatility from returns defined
on a longer time scale gives very similar results. On our set of pse stocks, we find that
σ128/
√
128 ≈ 0.84σ1, indicating a small anti-correlation of returns (∼ 15%) of short time
scales.
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Figure 9: Test of Eq. (32) for France Telecom in 2002. Each point corresponds to
a pair (〈S〉, σ1), computed by averaging over 10000 non overlapping trades (∼ two
trading days). Both quantities are expressed in basis points. From a linear fit, we find
c ≈ 1.69 with R2 = 0.90.
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Figure 10: Test of Eq. (32) for 68 stocks from the Paris Stock Exchange in 2002,
averaged over the entire year. The value of the linear regression slope is c ≈ 1.58, with
R2 = 0.96
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Figure 11: Test of Eq. (32) for the hangseng futures contract (triangles), and across
small tick Index Futures in 2005: cac, dax, ftse, ibex, mib, smi, hangseng (squares).
Each point corresponds to a pair (〈S〉, σ1), computed by averaging either over 1000
non overlapping trades (triangles) or over the whole year (squares). From a linear fit,
we find c ≈ 1.53 for the hangseng across time and c ≈ 1.17 across Index Futures.
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Figure 12: Test of Eq. (32) for stocks from the nyse in 2005. Each point corresponds
to a pair (〈S〉, σ1), computed by averaging over the entire year. Both quantities are
expressed in basis points. From a linear fit, we find c ≈ 1.32, , with R2 = 0.91
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impact function. Imposing that any market taking or liquidity providing strate-
gies is at best marginally profitable allows one to define viable regions of the
microstructural “phase-diagram” (Fig. 2) where electronic markets should op-
erate, and suggest a linear relation between spread and instantaneous impact.
This relation is in good agreement with empirical data on small tick contracts,
with a slope compatible with marginal profitability of both fast market making
and copy-cat market taking strategies. Somewhat paradoxically, we find that
liquidity providers as a whole offer average negative costs to market orders al-
though high frequency market making strategies still manage to get (marginally)
compensated. Our analysis allows us to compare in an objective way the spreads
in different markets and suggests that spreads are distinctly larger on the nyse.
Note that our analysis does not require any model specific assumptions such as
the nature of order flow correlations or the fraction of informed trades. In fact
our results hold even if trades were all uninformed but still mechanically impact
the price.
Making reasonable further assumptions, we have then shown that spread S
and volatility per trade σ1 are also proportional, a result that we confirm empir-
ically with correlations above 0.9. This very simple relation means that most of
the volatility comes from trading alone, and suggests that the bid-ask spread is
dominated by adverse selection, provided one considers the volatility per trade as
a measure of the amount of ‘information’ included in prices at each transaction.
There are indeed two complementary economic interpretations of the relation
σ1 ∼ S in small tick markets:
• (i) since the typical available liquidity in the order book is quite small,
market orders tend to grab a significant fraction of the volume at the best
price; furthermore, the size of the ‘gap’ above the ask or below the bid is
observed to be on the same order of magnitude as the bid-ask spread itself
which therefore sets a natural scale for price variations. Hence both the
impact and the volatility per trade are expected to be of the order of S, as
observed;
• (ii) the relation can also be read backward as S ∼ σ1: when the volatility
per trade is large, the risk of placing limit orders is large and therefore the
spread widens until limit orders become favorable.
Therefore, there is a clear two-way feedback that imposes the relation σ1 ∼ S,
valid on average; any significant deviation tends to be corrected by the resulting
relative flow of limit and market orders. Our result therefore appears as a funda-
mental property of the markets organization, which should be satisfied within any
theoretical description of the micro-structure. Zero intelligence models [32], or
bounded-range models [26, 30, 31] fail to predict any universal relation between
S and σ1.
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Our relation involves the volatility per trade whereas most of the econometric
work has instead focused on the volatility per unit time σ. The relation between
the two involves the trading frequency ν, which is itself both time- and stock-
dependent. As a function of time, we find, in agreement with [48], that volatility
per trade and trading frequency are positively correlated; the volatility σ =
σ1
√
ν therefore increases because both σ1 and ν increase.
19 Across stocks, on the
other hand, the volatility per unit time exhibit only weak systematic variations
with capitalization C: σ ∼ Cϕ with ϕ ≈ 0, whereas the trading frequency
increases with capitalization as ν ∼ Cζ . For stocks belonging to the ftse-
100, Zumbach finds ζ ≈ 0.44 [24], while for US stocks the scaling for ν is less
clear [49]. Interestingly, our result then leads to a result between average spread
and capitalization of the form S ∼ Cϕ−ζ/2 ∼ C−0.22, in good agreement with
Zumbach’s data [24], with the impact data of Lillo et al. [45] and with our own
data on the pse.
The fundamental question at this stage is to know what fixes the volatility σ
and the trading frequency ν. Clearly, the trading frequency has to do with the
available liquidity and the way large volumes have to be cut in small pieces. But
is the volatility per unit time the primary object, driven by a fundamental process
such as the arrival of news, to which the volatility per trade and therefore the
spread is slaved? Or is the market micro-structure and trading activity imposing,
in a bottom-up way, the value of the volatility? Understanding these coupled
dynamical problems appears to be a major challenge for the theory of financial
markets, and an unavoidable step to understand the interrelation between order
flow and price changes, and liquidity and market efficiency [9, 43, 20, 21, 37, 15,
16, 50].
We want to warmly thank S. Bogner, J. D. Farmer, Th. Foucault and G.
Zumbach for important and useful discussions. We also thank the referees for
very constructive remarks, which helped improving the manuscript.
Appendix 1: Impact and volatility in the mrr
model
From the basic equation determining the dynamics of the mid-point,
mi+1 −mi = pi+1 − pi − θρ(ǫi − ǫi−1) = ξi + θ(1− ρ)ǫi, (34)
19The long-memory property of σ is argued in [47] to be related to long range correlation in
the trading frequency rather than in the volatility per trade, but see [23].
27
one gets:
mi+ℓ −mi =
i+ℓ−1∑
j=i
ξj + θ(1− ρ)
i+ℓ−1∑
j=i
ǫj . (35)
Therefore, taking into account the correlation between ǫs, and the assumption
that external shocks are uncorrelated with the order flow, the impact function is:
Rℓ = 〈ǫi(mi+ℓ −mi)〉 = θ(1− ρ)
ℓ−1∑
ℓ′=0
ρℓ
′
= θ(1− ρℓ). (36)
Note that in this model, the ‘bare’ impact function G0(ℓ) defined in [15, 17]
through:
mi =
i−1∑
j=−∞
ξj +
i−1∑
j=−∞
G0(i− j − 1) ǫj , (37)
is here found to be constant, equal to G0(ℓ) = θ(1− ρ). Finally, one finds:
σ21 = 〈(mi+1 −mi)2〉 = Σ2 + θ2(1− ρ)2 (38)
and
σ2
∞
= Σ2 + θ2(1− ρ)2(1 + 2 ρ
1− ρ) = Σ
2 + θ2(1− ρ2) (39)
More generally, assuming that only the sign surprise matters, one can write, for
arbitrary correlations between signs:
mi+ℓ −mi =
i+ℓ−1∑
j=i
ξj + θ
i+ℓ−1∑
j=i
ǫj − 〈ǫj+1〉j, (40)
where the last term is the conditional expectation of the next sign. The impact
function now generalizes to:
Rℓ = θ [1− C(ℓ)] , (41)
and therefore λ∞ = 1/(1− C1).
Appendix 2: Summary statistics
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Code Name Code Name
ACA Credit Agricole IFG Infogrames Entertainment
AC Accor LG Lafarge
AF Air France-KLM LI Klepierre
AGF Assurances Generales de France LY Suez
AI Air Liquide MC LVMH
ALS Alstom RGPT ML Michelin
ALT Altran MMB Lagardere
AVE Aventis MMT M6-Metropole Television
BB Societe BIC NAD Wanadoo
BN Groupe Danone NK Imerys
CAP Cap Gemini OGE Orange
CA Carrefour OR L Oreal
CDI Christian Dior PEC Pechiney
CGE Alcatel PP PPR
CK Casino Guichard (pref.) PUB Publicis Groupe
CL Credit Lyonnais RF Eurazeo
CNP CNP Assurances RHA Rhodia
CO Casino Guichard RI Pernod-Ricard
CS AXA RNO Renault
CU Club Mediterranee RXL Rexel
CY Castorama Dubois SAG Safran
DEC JC Decaux SAN Sanofi-Aventis
DG Vinci SAX Atos Origin
DSY Dassault Systemes SCO SCOR
EF Essilor International SC Simco
EN Bouygues SU Schneider Electric
FP Total SW Sodexho Alliance
FR Valeo TEC Technip
FTE France Telecom TFI Television Francaise 1
GFC Gecina TMM Thomson
GLE Societe Generale UG Peugeot
GL Galeries Lafayette UL Unibail
HAV Havas VIE Veolia Environnement
HO Thales ZC Zodiac
Table 1: Codes and names of the pse stocks analyzed in Table 2.
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Code Tnv 〈qt〉 〈v〉 # σ1 〈S〉 σS R1 C1 λ∞ Tick
ACA 15.4 78 11.1 347 9.12 20.76 18.28 2.30 0.28 1.70 5.13
AC 22.1 87 26.3 211 8.97 12.45 13.00 2.99 0.26 2.16 2.68
AF 4.0 40 7.2 139 14.40 25.96 25.57 3.85 0.23 2.30 7.01
AGF 9.6 80 16.9 142 13.32 19.17 18.88 4.28 0.28 2.28 5.46
AI 34.0 154 26.9 316 8.21 13.72 11.07 3.06 0.26 1.42 6.87
ALS 14.2 57 13.0 274 14.75 23.11 20.80 4.84 0.14 1.84 12.02
ALT 12.7 53 14.6 217 23.66 30.75 27.88 7.15 0.17 2.71 11.04
AVE 134.1 362 62.6 536 6.70 11.18 7.31 2.59 0.21 1.72 7.54
BB 0.8 30 11.9 16 28.80 43.94 47.51 7.78 0.33 1.66 2.55
BN 59.5 310 45.9 324 6.30 11.80 7.79 2.37 0.28 1.03 7.62
CAP 34.7 94 28.9 300 12.71 17.27 17.03 4.39 0.20 2.55 5.17
CA 79.8 229 40.1 497 6.92 12.20 9.16 2.48 0.22 1.85 5.35
CDI 5.1 59 14.9 86 18.76 32.32 29.08 6.23 0.29 1.74 2.79
CGE 79.8 152 21.3 936 10.49 20.94 14.85 3.31 0.13 1.70 15.37
CK 0.3 37 11.4 6 20.43 46.72 32.24 7.37 0.22 0.93 8.06
CL 30.1 163 23.0 328 8.05 13.60 13.04 1.96 0.36 1.77 3.43
CNP 1.7 41 9.3 45 15.58 31.12 33.74 3.53 0.31 1.43 2.67
CO 13.8 98 22.9 151 10.38 15.43 14.42 3.47 0.27 1.50 6.58
CS 96.1 144 36.6 657 8.32 12.78 10.17 3.13 0.17 1.97 6.39
CU 1.0 22 7.7 32 30.02 44.83 47.65 8.85 0.23 1.84 3.97
CY 15.4 2148 77.1 50 8.64 14.61 14.49 2.35 0.26 1.67 8.03
DEC 0.7 27 12.7 13 43.75 78.92 77.84 13.81 0.33 1.53 8.15
DG 16.8 134 25.4 165 8.02 14.05 10.90 2.76 0.22 1.24 7.76
DSY 10.4 65 19.6 133 17.06 22.11 23.83 5.71 0.27 2.30 5.28
EF 5.6 59 20.4 69 13.21 21.38 23.01 3.94 0.25 1.90 2.52
EN 17.8 66 21.3 210 10.15 14.55 14.35 3.47 0.25 1.85 3.46
FP 322.4 662 114.4 705 4.96 9.17 4.86 2.12 0.20 1.49 6.71
FR 8.3 80 24.1 86 13.84 20.60 22.46 4.39 0.25 1.99 3.50
FTE 112.7 137 29.5 956 9.12 15.04 12.57 2.93 0.14 1.85 6.39
GFC 0.3 35 9.9 7 17.85 27.74 31.55 4.56 0.27 0.98 5.62
GLE 82.7 239 46.0 449 8.07 12.70 9.27 3.04 0.23 2.26 7.07
GL 0.9 43 13.6 17 24.34 41.34 39.96 6.92 0.29 1.38 7.24
HAV 8.1 57 14.6 139 21.15 32.44 26.53 7.41 0.18 1.91 17.15
HO 11.3 61 19.7 143 10.68 15.02 15.86 3.65 0.29 1.94 2.85
IFG 3.2 24 4.9 163 29.05 40.35 32.95 8.51 0.15 2.31 21.79
LG 38.2 193 36.6 261 7.82 13.31 9.99 2.90 0.24 1.67 7.33
LI 0.2 50 15.8 3 14.43 29.90 23.18 4.69 0.20 0.70 8.54
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Code Tnv 〈qt〉 〈v〉 # σ1 〈S〉 σS R1 C1 λ∞ Tick
LY 58.4 111 28.8 507 8.40 12.84 11.94 3.11 0.20 1.97 4.31
MC 52.9 143 34.7 381 8.01 12.41 10.75 3.01 0.26 2.20 4.18
ML 13.2 71 21.2 156 10.23 14.98 15.36 3.35 0.30 1.93 2.71
MMB 13.3 76 18.9 177 10.67 15.96 15.84 3.60 0.25 1.94 3.50
MMT 0.7 33 10.1 17 33.82 49.77 48.42 9.71 0.32 1.66 3.57
NAD 4.6 47 6.0 188 14.39 31.27 20.91 4.11 0.17 1.89 20.36
NK 1.1 43 13.4 21 25.95 42.89 39.34 7.69 0.29 1.40 8.07
OGE 36.4 182 21.2 429 11.40 21.53 13.35 3.57 0.16 1.82 16.03
OR 68.0 211 41.9 406 7.30 12.45 9.45 2.76 0.25 1.39 6.59
PEC 9.5 110 31.9 75 15.06 23.71 24.89 5.07 0.24 2.41 5.45
PP 36.8 154 31.5 292 10.08 15.44 13.25 3.39 0.25 2.23 7.23
PUB 11.9 78 27.3 109 15.08 21.19 22.92 4.97 0.23 2.46 3.85
RF 0.1 25 7.0 3 22.27 37.26 32.69 7.07 0.23 0.72 8.25
RHA 2.1 32 9.7 55 21.45 33.99 32.97 6.71 0.22 1.87 10.83
RI 12.6 138 39.1 80 10.49 16.82 16.01 3.64 0.22 1.49 6.42
RNO 35.8 158 34.4 260 8.01 12.80 11.13 2.71 0.25 2.27 4.38
RXL 0.7 34 13.0 14 31.30 51.91 50.49 9.21 0.26 1.50 6.77
SAG 1.5 36 10.3 35 24.59 43.15 42.89 7.29 0.22 1.73 7.48
SAN 94.2 301 56.4 417 7.76 12.18 8.60 3.04 0.25 1.49 7.92
SAX 6.0 57 20.4 73 23.28 33.48 33.79 7.45 0.27 2.58 5.23
SCO 2.0 25 9.3 55 35.67 38.88 40.00 8.37 0.23 2.16 7.40
SC 0.5 55 13.9 10 12.24 21.08 19.01 3.58 0.22 1.28 6.10
SU 26.2 129 33.0 198 9.52 14.60 13.43 3.30 0.26 2.15 5.63
SW 11.2 67 19.5 144 14.48 18.19 20.40 4.26 0.32 1.92 3.22
TEC 9.4 123 31.6 74 16.27 24.27 25.77 5.06 0.24 2.18 7.31
TFI 17.4 63 21.0 207 11.91 15.87 16.19 4.09 0.25 2.07 3.71
TMM 28.0 78 20.8 338 10.08 16.08 15.59 3.18 0.19 2.34 4.29
UG 33.2 141 36.2 229 7.95 11.91 10.80 2.86 0.26 2.11 4.43
UL 3.0 64 22.9 33 14.61 24.45 23.47 4.87 0.27 1.41 8.07
VIE 19.8 77 24.8 199 11.52 16.60 17.81 3.75 0.23 2.23 3.57
ZC 0.9 33 8.7 26 24.95 41.99 42.40 7.28 0.24 1.64 4.21
Table 2: Pool of the 68 stocks of the pse studied in this paper, with their summary
statistics for 2002. The daily turnover is in million Euros, 〈qt〉 is the average amount in
book (bid+ask) in thousand Euros, 〈v〉 is the average size of market order (in thousand
Euros). The total number of trades (in thousand) corresponds to the whole year 2002.
The volatility per trade σ1, the average spread 〈S〉, the spread standard deviation σS ,
the average response R1 and the average tick size are all in basis points. Note that
σS ≈ 〈S〉, characteristic of an exponential distribution of the spread. Note also that
the volume available at the best prices is ∼ 10−3 of the daily turnover.
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Code Turnover 〈qt〉 〈v〉 # trade σ1 〈S〉 σS R1 Tick
LMEB 262 21 199 211 8.4 46.7 4.4 11.5 46.6
Table 3: Summary statistics for Ericsson in the period March 2004-November 2004.
Units are the same as in Table 2, except 〈qt〉 which is now in million Euros. Note that
〈v〉/〈qt〉 ≈ 10−2.
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